

SKYPULSE MEDIA

A Synclav Global Group venture

THE ASK

\$1,500,000

Pre-seed · 18-month operating plan

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MOVING SCREENS. CAPTIVE CITIES. MEASURED.

India's first programmatic mobile DOOH network with route-level proof of play and real-time attribution.

August 2026

We are building the operating system for **measurable outdoor advertising**

01

Own the inventory

A fleet of LED vans and event drones operating fixed, permitted routes in Tier 2 cities. Owning the screens means owning the data they produce.

02

Instrument every play

GPS, IoT telemetry and timestamped proof of play on every slot sold. Every impression has a route, a time and a location behind it.

03

Sell measured outcomes

PulseGrid turns that telemetry into footfall attribution and campaign reporting, so a media buyer can compare us against digital on evidence.

WHERE THE COMPANY STANDS TODAY

Pre-revenue

No paid campaigns billed to date

Patna

Beachhead city selected and mapped

Pre-seed

First institutional round

Solo founder

Three key hires funded by this round

We are not claiming a proven business. We are asking for capital to produce the evidence.

A \$1.4B market where **four in five dollars** still cannot prove delivery

\$1.4B

India outdoor advertising market, 2025
[1]

\$284M

of that is digital OOH, 2024 [2]

~80%

of Indian OOH spend is still non-digital
[1][2]

13.9%

implied CAGR of India DOOH to 2030
[2]

1

Delivery is asserted, not evidenced

A static hoarding cannot tell a buyer when the creative ran, who passed it, or whether anyone walked into the store afterwards. The category sells reach on affidavit.

2

Premium inventory is gatekept

High-traffic sites in Tier 2 cities are held on long leases by legacy operators. A regional QSR chain with a modest monthly budget has no route into the good inventory at all.

3

Buyers now price on accountability

Media budgets have moved to channels that report. Outdoor keeps its share only where it can produce comparable numbers, and most Indian outdoor inventory cannot.

The problem is not that outdoor stopped working. It is that outdoor stopped being comparable.

THE SOLUTION

PulseGrid: from campaign brief to **attributed footfall**, in one system

01

Brief & book

Buyer selects city, route, daypart and budget in PulseGrid

02

Route & permit

System assigns permitted routes and available screen slots

03

Dispatch

Van or drone runs the route; creative pushed over the air

04

Play & log

GPS ping and timestamped proof of play on every slot

05

Attribute

Exposure matched to footfall and store-visit signals

06

Report & re-book

Route-level report; buyer re-books against what worked

PRODUCT PORTFOLIO

PulseGrid LED Van

IN BUILD

P6 high-brightness LED panel on a commercial chassis, with GPS, IoT connectivity and on-board proof-of-play logging. The core revenue unit.

PulseGrid LED Drone

PLANNED

Heavy-lift platform with an LED payload for event activations and high-density corridors. Permit-dependent and treated as secondary inventory.

PulseGrid OS

MVP FUNDED BY THIS ROUND

Booking, route assignment, proof of play, campaign reporting and an agency API. Attribution runs on a third-party footfall partner at MVP stage.

The van earns the revenue. The software earns the defensibility.

Three things changed at once: hardware cost, buyer expectation, and category growth

1 Hardware fell within reach of a fleet model

A revenue-generating unit is budgeted at \$18,000 all-in. At that capex, a single van needs roughly \$1,554 of monthly contribution to pay back inside a year, which is a testable number rather than a heroic one.

Management target. Three written vendor quotations are a condition of the first capex tranche.

2 Measurement became the price of entry

Media buyers now ask outdoor for the same reporting they get from digital: proof of play, audience estimation and post-campaign attribution. PulseGrid is built so measurement is the product, not an add-on.

Management observation from agency conversations; to be evidenced by signed insertion orders.

3 The category itself is compounding

India DOOH is estimated at \$284M in 2024 and forecast to reach \$620M by 2030, an implied 13.9% CAGR. That is the tide behind the category, and it is a reference point, not a SkyPulse revenue forecast.

MarkNtel Advisors, India DOOH Market. [2]

\$1.5M funds an 18-month window to convert these tailwinds into paid, measured campaigns.

MARKET SIZE

\$1.4B TAM, a \$60M city-level wedge, and a 3.4% month-18 target


TAM	\$1.4B	India outdoor advertising market	IMARC Group, 2025 estimate [1]
India DOOH	\$284M	Digital share of that market in 2024	MarkNtel Advisors [2]
Programmatic filter	\$85M	30% planning filter applied to the 2024 DOOH base	Management planning filter — to validate with agency spend data
SAM	\$60M	20 target Tier 1-2 cities × \$3M annual mobile and transit DOOH spend	Management defined — to be replaced with agency budgets and rate cards
SOM, month 18	\$2.03M	Base-case annualised run-rate revenue at month 18	SkyPulse operating model, base case

HOW THE WEDGE IS BUILT

We do not claim a share of the \$1.4B. The only number we operate against is the \$60M wedge: 20 cities where mobile and transit outdoor is bought at all.

Month-18 base case reaches \$2.03M of annualised revenue, or 3.4% of that wedge, from a single beachhead plus one expansion route.

SCALE OF THE FUNNEL



BEACHHEAD → EXPANSION

Patna first. Lucknow, Indore and Chandigarh are candidates only after demand, collections and route contribution are proven.

We are not assuming 25% market share. We are targeting 3.4% of a wedge we defined ourselves — and we will replace that definition with agency data.

[1] IMARC Group, India Outdoor Advertising Market. [2] MarkNtel Advisors, India DOOH Market. The programmatic filter and SAM are management-defined planning constructs, not third-party estimates, and are flagged as such in the assumption register.

Three revenue streams, **one of them primary**

Direct-to-Brand

PRIMARY

\$104K

61% of month-18 revenue

Brands book inventory directly at rate card. Highest margin, slowest to scale, and the stream that produces the case studies.

Agency Partnerships

SECONDARY

\$49K

29% of month-18 revenue

Agencies book on behalf of brands at rate card less 12.5%. Larger briefs and lower selling cost per dollar of inventory sold.

PulseGrid Licensing

OPTION

\$16K

10% of month-18 revenue

Booking and proof-of-play workflows licensed to other operators from month 7. Planned, not contracted. Treat as upside, not as base.

PRICING, WORKED THROUGH

$\$12 \text{ per 30-second slot} \cdot 10 \text{ paid slots per screen per day} = \$120 \text{ per screen day}$
 $\text{Monthly route package at 80\% fill} = \$2,880 \text{ per screen} \cdot \text{Drone activation} = \750 per show
 $\text{Agency rate} = \text{rate card less 12.5\%} \cdot \text{PulseGrid licence} = \$1,800 \text{ per operator per month}$

WHO BUYS, AND WHY

Regional QSR and retail chains — drive footfall to a named outlet this week
Real estate and education — compress a launch or admissions window into one corridor
Automotive dealerships — hyperlocal reach around the showroom catchment
Regional FMCG and telco, via agencies — Tier 2 reach their national plans miss

Media revenue funds the company. Software revenue is the reason the company is worth more than its fleet.

Nobody else is combining Tier 2 mobile inventory with measurement

	Tier 2 coverage	Mobile inventory	Proof of play	Programmatic booking	Footfall attribution	Entry price for a local brand
SkyPulse PulseGrid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Via partner	Low
National OOH networks	Limited	No	Partial	Partial	Limited	High
Digital billboard networks	Limited	No	Yes	Partial	Limited	High
Local LED van operators	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Low
Social and digital advertising	Yes	n.a.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low

Route density and permits

Permitted, mapped routes in a beachhead city are slow to assemble and slow to copy.

Operating data

Every campaign adds proof-of-play and footfall history that a new entrant starts without.

Lean cost base

A Patna cost structure serves a Tier 2 brand at a price a metro-cost operator cannot match.

Software leverage

PulseGrid can be licensed to operators we do not want to compete with.

We are not fighting national networks for metro hoardings. We are building the measured layer under Tier 2 outdoor.

This matrix is management's assessment of publicly observable positioning as at August 2026. It has not been verified against competitor disclosures and should be treated as a positioning view, not as researched fact.

What is built, what is in motion, and **what this round is for**

BUILT

- Beachhead city selected, corridors and route density mapped
- PulseGrid product specification and end-to-end workflow defined
- 18-month operating model with unit economics, scenarios and capital gates
- Vehicle and LED panel specification drafted to a \$18,000 unit budget
- Brand, website and investor collateral live at skypulsemedia.in

IN MOTION

- Three written vendor quotations for the van build — condition of first capex tranche
- Permit pathway with municipal authorities for route and hoarding approvals
- Agency and brand conversations in the beachhead, targeting 3-5 LOIs
- Attribution partner shortlist for footfall and store-visit measurement

FUNDED BY THIS ROUND

- First 6 vans deployed and 5-10 paid campaigns closed in months 1-3
- Route-level proof-of-play, collections and downtime recorded from day one
- PulseGrid MVP live for internal operations by month 9
- Realised price, utilisation and receivable days replacing today's assumptions

What we are not claiming: no paid revenue has been billed to date, no LOI is signed yet, and no advisor appointment is confirmed. Every figure in this deck is a forecast or a management assumption, and the assumption register in the appendix names each one.

A pre-seed investor is buying the plan and the founder. Overstating traction is the fastest way to lose both.

Win the beachhead on evidence, then **sell the evidence upward**

Months 1-3

Land the first ten

Founder-led direct selling into named local QSR, retail, education and real-estate accounts. Discounted pilot rates in exchange for the right to publish the results.

Months 3-9

Turn results into a rate card

Publish route-level case studies. Convert pilot accounts to repeat monthly bookings. Open agency conversations with proof-of-play data rather than a pitch.

Months 9-18

Build the agency channel

VP of Sales works regional agency desks. Agencies bring larger briefs at a 12.5% discount, lowering selling cost per dollar of inventory sold.

ACQUISITION ECONOMICS, MONTH 18

\$2,344

Fully loaded CAC
inc. sales payroll

\$35.5K

Lifetime value
at 5% monthly churn

15.2x

LTV to CAC

52

Active advertisers

CAC is stated fully loaded — demand-generation spend plus the sales team. Marketing-only CAC is \$786 and we do not lead with it.

CHANNELS, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY

1. Founder-led direct sales into named accounts in the beachhead
2. Repeat and referral from published campaign results
3. Regional media agency desks, from month 9
4. Event and activation partners for drone inventory
5. Inbound from PulseGrid licensing conversations with other operators

The first ten customers are not a marketing problem. They are the founder's job, and they are what makes the eleventh cheap.

Capital is released against **measured demand**, not against a calendar

M1-3

Paid pilot

First 6 vans live in Patna. 5-10 paid campaigns closed. Proof of play, collections and downtime recorded from the first invoice.

Gate: campaigns billed and collected

M3-6

Customer validation

3-5 agency or brand LOIs. Realised price per slot, utilisation and receivable days measured against the model.

Gate: utilisation at or above plan

M4-9

PulseGrid MVP

Booking, route logging, proof of play and campaign reporting live for internal operations and the first agency workflows.

Gate: MVP running live campaigns

M7-12

Scale on evidence

Fleet to 30 vans and 4 drones. Monthly revenue reaches \$85K. Each tranche of capex requires two consecutive months at plan.

Gate: route contribution positive

M13-18

Breakeven and readiness

Fleet to 50 vans and 10 drones. EBITDA turns positive in month 13. Data room assembled for the follow-on round.

Gate: repeat bookings and clean data room

Every fleet tranche has a gate in front of it. That is the difference between a fleet business and a capex hobby.

UNIT ECONOMICS

\$18,000 per unit, \$1,554 monthly contribution, 11.6-month payback

Metric	LED van	LED drone
Capital cost per unit	\$18,000	\$18,000
Revenue ceiling at 100% utilisation	\$3,600	\$3,000
Net revenue at 80% utilisation, after agency mix	\$2,754	\$2,295
Direct operating cost per month	\$1,200	\$1,100
Monthly contribution	\$1,554	\$1,195
Simple payback	11.6 months	15.1 months
Annual cash-on-capex return	104%	80%

WHAT THIS NUMBER IS NOT

Unit contribution is stated before corporate overhead, customer acquisition and financing. Allocating month-18 overhead across the deployed fleet extends van payback to about 30 months. Unit economics are a hypothesis to validate, not a realised return.

Utilisation	Van contribution	Van payback
50%	\$521	34.5 months
60%	\$866	20.8 months
70%	\$1,210	14.9 months
80% (plan)	\$1,554	11.6 months
90%	\$1,898	9.5 months

READ THIS TABLE FIRST

Payback is a utilisation story, not a capex story. Below roughly 70% utilisation the unit stops paying back inside a year. Proving sustained utilisation is the single most important output of the pilot.

The unit works at 80% utilisation. The round exists to find out whether 80% is real.


FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS

\$169K monthly revenue by month 18, EBITDA positive from month 13

	Month 6	Month 12	Month 18
Fleet	12 vans / 2 drones	30 vans / 4 drones	50 vans / 10 drones
Utilisation	55%	72%	80%
Monthly revenue	\$23.2K	\$85.1K	\$169.3K
Annualised run-rate	\$278K	\$1.02M	\$2.03M
Gross margin	36%	55%	60%
Monthly EBITDA	(\$30.1K)	(\$21)	\$44.7K
EBITDA margin	n.m.	n.m.	26.4%
Closing cash	\$1.11M	\$611K	\$202K
Headcount	10	15	18

WHY THESE NUMBERS DIFFER FROM THE EARLIER PLAN

Revenue now recognises a half month on newly deployed units and applies the agency discount to the agency share; overhead is built from a named hiring plan. Slightly lower revenue, materially earlier breakeven.



Month 13

Monthly EBITDA turns positive

Two months earlier than the previous plan, because overhead is now built bottom-up from a named hiring plan rather than assumed as a flat monthly figure.

\$1.08M

Of the round goes into fleet capex

72% of the raise buys revenue-generating assets. Cumulative EBITDA across the 18 months is (\$107K): the operating business is close to self-funding while the fleet is being built.

\$202K

Closing cash at month 18

Thin, and deliberately shown rather than smoothed. It is the reason the plan carries a monthly board capex gate and a 40-day collection assumption.

Base case reaches operating breakeven while retaining a cash buffer. It does not claim early profitability.

The worst case is the one that decides whether \$1.5M is enough

	Worst case	Base case	Best case
Levers: utilisation · pricing · cost	-25% · -15% · +15%	Plan · rate card · plan	+15% · +10% · -5%
Month-18 monthly revenue	\$105.7K	\$169.3K	\$213.9K
Month-18 run-rate revenue	\$1.27M	\$2.03M	\$2.57M
Month-18 monthly EBITDA	(\$34.7K)	\$44.7K	\$92.7K
EBITDA breakeven	Not within 18 months	Month 13	Month 10
Additional capital required	\$437K	None	None

What breaks the plan

Utilisation, not capex. A 25% shortfall against the utilisation ramp, combined with 15% discounting, is enough to keep the company loss-making at month 18 and to open a \$437K funding gap.

What we do about it

The capex gate. Fleet tranches are released only after two consecutive months at plan. In the worst case the fleet stops growing, capex stops, and the gap never opens.

What we would tell you


If utilisation is below 60% at month 6, we pause purchases and redirect capital into demand generation and agency contracts rather than deploying into weak demand.

A worst case that needs more money is not a reason to hide it. It is the reason the capex gate exists.

THE ASK

\$1.5M pre-seed to **prove and scale the fleet model**

Allocation of the \$1.5M round



Fleet capex

\$1,080,000

72%

50 LED vans and 10 drones at an \$18,000 unit budget, released tranche by tranche against measured demand

PulseGrid OS & data

\$150,000

10%

Booking, routing, proof of play, attribution and reporting, including engineering payroll

Team & corporate ops

\$120,000

8%

Field management, sales coordination, finance and operating controls

Demand generation

\$75,000

5%

Paid pilot campaigns, agency development, collateral and customer validation

Permits, safety & legal

\$45,000

3%

Municipal approvals, insurance, compliance and commercial contracting

Working capital reserve

\$30,000

2%

Collections timing, repairs and operating contingency

WHAT \$1.5M BUYS

50 vans and 10 drones deployed · \$2.03M annualised run-rate revenue · EBITDA positive from month 13 · paid contracts, collections history and a live PulseGrid MVP

THE CAPITAL GATE

No fleet tranche is purchased without two consecutive months at planned utilisation. Uncommitted capex stays in reserve if permits or demand slip.

\$1.5M buys evidence: paid demand, repeatable unit contribution, and an operating data moat.

Six things that could go wrong, and **what we do about each**

Utilisation risk

Slots go unsold and payback stretches past two years.

Pilot before scale. Capex gated on two consecutive months at plan. Event activations as fallback inventory.

Regulatory & permit risk

Municipal approvals for mobile hoardings and drone activations are slow or withdrawn.

Head of Operations hired with municipal relations experience. Permit pathway engaged before deployment, not after.

Capex risk

Unit cost lands above the \$18,000 budget on duty, FX or fabrication.

Three written vendor quotations before the first tranche. Lease and rental structures evaluated to reduce upfront capital.

Collections risk

Indian media receivables commonly run 60-90 days and starve the cash cycle.

Deposits and milestone billing on new accounts. Receivable days reported monthly. Model assumes 40 days and flags the exposure.

Execution & key-person risk

A solo, non-technical founder carries the plan.

Three senior hires funded by this round: sales, operations and engineering. Advisory seats being confirmed, not claimed.

Technology risk

PulseGrid is unbuilt and attribution is unproven.

MVP-first. Attribution runs on a third-party footfall partner rather than in-house modelling until volume justifies it.

None of these risks is fatal in month one. All of them are fatal if we deploy 50 vans before testing 6.

Founder-led today, **three senior hires funded by this round**



Somraj (SOCH)

Founder & CEO

Eight years across digital media and operations, and founder of the Synclav Global Group. Deep working knowledge of the eastern India market, the Tier 2 advertiser base and the municipal environment the fleet has to operate in.

Non-technical by background, which is why the lead engineering hire is funded before the fleet scales.

VP Sales & Partnerships

Month 2

Owns the agency channel and the conversion of pilot accounts into repeat monthly bookings. Recruited from a Tier 1 media agency desk.

Head of Operations

Month 1

Owns fleet uptime, route permits and municipal relationships — the function that most often kills an asset-heavy media business.

Lead Developer, PulseGrid

Month 3

Owns booking, route logging, proof of play and the agency API. The MVP is the deliverable, not a platform vision.

Headcount plan

10 people by month 6, 15 by month 12, 18 by month 18. Drivers and drone operators sit in per-unit operating cost, not in this headcount.

ADVISORY BOARD

TARGET PROFILES — NOT YET CONFIRMED

Former VP, national OOH network

Industry strategy, inventory pricing and competitive positioning.

Senior media buyer, agency

Buyer-side needs, rate card credibility and the agency route to market.

Municipal relations specialist

Permitting strategy across the beachhead and expansion cities.

We list these as roles we are recruiting for, not as people already on board. Names and signed appointments will be added as they are confirmed.

The single largest execution risk in this deck is key-person risk. The round's first three hires exist to reduce it.

We are not asking for blind faith.

We are asking for capital to prove the model in 18 months.

\$1.4B

Category the fleet plays into

India outdoor advertising market [1]

\$60M

Addressable city-level wedge

20 target cities, management defined

11.6 mo

Unit payback at planned utilisation

\$18K capex, \$1,554 monthly contribution

Month 13

EBITDA breakeven in the base case

\$2.03M run-rate revenue by month 18

WHAT HAPPENS IN THE FIRST 90 DAYS AFTER CLOSE

Six vans on Patna corridors · five to ten paid campaigns closed and collected · proof of play recorded on every slot · vendor quotations and permits on file · first monthly investor report issued

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Sources, and the assumptions we have not yet proven

EXTERNAL SOURCES

- [1] IMARC Group — India Outdoor Advertising Market. Used for the \$1.4B category reference, 2025 estimate.
- [2] MarkNtel Advisors — India Digital Out-of-Home Advertising Market. \$284M in 2024, forecast \$620M by 2030; the 13.9% CAGR is derived from those two figures.
- [3] Mordor Intelligence — India OOH and DOOH Market. Used for category structure and competitive context.
- [4] NFX — Fundraising checklist, proof points for Series A. Used to set the follow-on readiness gates.
- [5] Companies Act 2013, Schedule II — asset life used for the 60-month depreciation schedule.

MANAGEMENT ASSUMPTIONS AWAITING EVIDENCE

- | | |
|--|---|
| \$18,000 unit capex | → Three written vendor quotations |
| 10 slots per day at \$12 per slot | → Signed insertion orders and proof-of-play logs |
| \$1,200 monthly van running cost | → Pilot cost records for fuel, driver, permits, repairs |
| 40% to 80% utilisation ramp | → Proof of play against sellable slots, not booked slots |
| Platform revenue from month 7 | → Signed licence agreements — treat as zero until then |
| 40-day collection period | → Invoice ageing and bank statements |
| \$60M addressable wedge | → Agency budgets, rate cards, competitor inventory counts |
| \$6.0M pre-money | → Comparable Indian pre-seed rounds and evidence at closing |

Every number in this deck is either sourced above or listed here as an assumption awaiting evidence.